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 Abstract 
 Th is paper oﬀ ers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s 
recent paper ‘Th e Basis of Human Moral Status’. I argue that Liao’s account both does too much 
and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not 
provide grounds for oﬀ ering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these 
troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his ‘physical basis of moral 
agency’ account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional ‘speciesist’ 
view. 
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 S. Matthew Liao’s paper, ‘Th e Basis of Human Moral Status’, oﬀ ers an original 
and important argument for the claim that ‘virtually all human beings’ are 
rightholders. 1 More speciﬁ cally, he argues that it is a suﬃ  cient condition for 
being a rightholder that a creature possess ‘the genetic basis for moral agency’, 
and since virtually all humans do possess this genetic basis, we should view 
those individuals as having the moral status of rightholders. In this paper 
I’ll oﬀ er several objections to Liao’s account, and argue that Liao would in 
fact be better oﬀ  with something closer to a traditional speciesist view, 
 according to which all human beings are rightholders by virtue of their species 
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membership (rather than their possession of the genetic basis for moral 
agency). 
 Th e Genetic Basis for Moral Agency Account 
 According to Liao, to be a rightholder something need  not :
 (a)  be a moral agent 
 (b)  have the potential to be a moral agent 
 (c)  be of a kind (species) whose normal members are moral agents. 
 Instead, Liao argues that it is a suﬃ  cient condition for being a rightholder that 
an organism have ‘integrated’ into itself the genetic basis for moral agency 
(178). By ‘integrated’ Liao means that the genes that comprise the genetic 
material for agency must be ‘activated and coordinating with each other in an 
appropriate way’ (165, 178). Liao further claims that it isn’t the fact that such 
material is  genetic that is morally relevant, so he admits that a non-organic 
entity which possessed something ‘functionally similar’ to the genetic basis for 
moral agency (what he calls ‘the physical basis for the development of moral 
agency’) would also count as a rightholder on this account (169). 
 Liao is motivated to put forward this new account because he accepts 
the widely-held conviction that all human beings are rightholders but also 
acknowledges the apparent illegitimacy of favoring one species over another 
without adequate justiﬁ cation. Wanting to avoid the unsavory label of ‘spe-
ciesist’, Liao has developed an account of rightholding that does not, in prin-
ciple, exclude members of other species from being rightholders. Not only 
does Liao’s account not exclude members of other species from being right-
holders, it also oﬀ ers us a species-neutral criterion that can be employed for 
objectively evaluating when it is that members of other species deserve that 
same status. 
 It is easy to sympathize with Liao’s goals here. Oﬀ ering a comprehensive 
theory that can account for the very strong intuition that all human beings are 
rightholders while avoiding the charge of speciesism would be a very signiﬁ -
cant philosophical accomplishment. But the theory Liao presents and defends 
falls short in two very important respects:
 1.  It doesn’t show that all human being are rightholders, as it allows that there 
could be (and perhaps are) human beings who lack the relevant genetic 
basis for moral agency. 
 2.  It does, however, grant rightholder status to entities that are  not human 
and that do not, intuitively, seem to deserve such status. 
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 Humans Lacking the Genetic Basis for Moral Agency 
 Regarding point one, Liao bites the bullet and admits that it is theoretically 
possible that someone could lack the genetic basis for moral agency and yet 
still be a human being, and thus his approach does not justify attributing the 
status of rightholder to such individuals. 2 He also (more reluctantly) admits it 
is possible that there really are such human beings: for example, it is an open 
question whether some cases of anencephaly have the sort of genetic cause that 
also aﬀ ects the genes necessary for moral agency. 3 In addition, he does not 
deny that there could be cases of severe retardation caused by damage to the 
genetic basis for moral agency. Nevertheless, Liao does his best to downplay 
the possibility that some humans might not count as rightholders due to 
genetic damage. He points out that many genetic defects are caused by the 
mutation of a single gene, and there is the implication that since only one gene 
is involved, the chances of the genetic material responsible for moral agency 
being damaged are slim. However, Liao does not have an account of  which 
genes  are relevant for moral agency. Given the possibility that the necessary 
genes may be widely diﬀ used throughout the genome, taken together with our 
knowledge that damage to just one gene can cause devastating results aﬀ ecting 
the whole range of human functioning, it seems plausible that, on a reason -
able sketch of what counts as ‘the genetic basis for moral agency’, some exist-
ing single-gene defects may turn out to involve genes that are a part of that 
genetic basis. If so, then we may have many real-life cases in which damage to 
one gene can be correctly described as a ‘genetic defect to the genes that make 
up’ the capacity for moral agency. 
 Liao resists this sort of reasoning and instead argues that much genetic 
damage should be seen as simply ‘undermining’ an attribute rather than count-
ing as ‘damage to the basis of that attribute’. As evidence for this claim, he 
points to the fact that in some cases of single-gene defects early medical inter-
vention can still allow the human in question to develop normally:
 Mental retardation and other defects are typically caused by abnormal build-ups 
of certain amino acids that become toxic to the brain and other tissues, because 
the cell is unable to process these amino acids owing to the mutation. But with 
treatment of a low enzyme diet as soon as possible in the neonatal age, normal 
 2 Liao concedes this point on p. 167, ‘It might be necessary to concede that there is a theoreti-
cal possibility that a human being could lack the genetic basis for moral agency, even if all present 
cases are not ones in which human beings lack this basis’. Liao does not go on to consider the 
diﬃ  culties that this concession raises for his approach. 
 3 Liao also seems to accept this point in n. 19 on p. 166 of his essay . 
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growth and cognitive development can be expected in many cases. For our 
purpose, this shows that the brain tissue has initially developed normally and 
would have continued to do so except for the abnormal build up of the amino 
acids. Th erefore, following the distinction between genetic defects of the genes 
that make up an attribute and genetic defects that undermine the development of 
the attribute, single gene defects seem to be cases of the latter rather than the 
former. Given this, one can say that human beings who have these kinds of genetic 
defects most likely have the genetic basis for moral agency (167). 
 I worry that Liao moves too quickly in generalizing here. It may be that  some 
single-gene genetic defects are such that a human possessing them can develop 
normally if given early treatment, but it just doesn’t follow that we should thus 
presume (as he does) that all single-gene defects ought to thus be classiﬁ ed as 
cases in which the development of moral agency is ‘undermined’ rather than 
prevented due to damage to the relevant genes. 
 Perhaps Liao will turn out to be right about single-gene defects, however. 
Let’s grant that at this stage we simply do not know enough about our genetic 
makeup to determine which genes are relevant for moral agency, and so it 
 could turn out that there are currently  no human beings with defects of the 
genes that make up the capacity for moral agency. It may be that all the variet-
ies of genetic damage that currently prevent some humans from possessing 
moral agency can be accurately characterized as damage that merely under-
mines the capacity for such agency. From the comfort of my armchair I’m 
happy to admit this, but I don’t think it ultimately helps Liao’s case. Th is is 
because it is the mere  possibility that the moral status of a human could hinge 
on that sort of empirical claim that highlights the deeper diﬃ  culties with 
Liao’s approach. 
 Consider the following hypothetical scenario: due to your being exposed to 
a new and dangerous type of radiation, your child (let’s call her Betsy) suﬀ ers 
from a genetic disorder that has left her alive and conscious but with a level of 
intelligence that falls well below what is necessary for ever exercising moral 
agency. Th is disorder is new, very rare and not well understood, but the doc-
tors, having performed many tests, assure you that, though your child’s genetic 
damage does  permanently undermine her capacity for moral agency, the dam-
aged genetic material is not among the material that makes up ‘the genetic 
basis for moral agency’. As a Liaoian, you breathe a sigh of relief, conﬁ dent 
that your child is in fact deserving of the moral status we extend to most 
humans. However, imagine that several months later the doctor calls back: 
there’s been a terrible mix up, and your child’s test results were swapped with 
those of another severely disabled child. It turns out that your child does, as a 
matter of fact, suﬀ er from genetic damage to the relevant portion of the 
genome responsible for moral agency, for she is missing a single highly relevant 
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gene. (‘Sorry honey, the new results are in, and it turns out Betsy may not be 
a rightholder after all!’) 4 
 Surely there is a problem with any account of moral status that could (even 
just theoretically) put you in this position. How can something which matters 
 so much (your child’s moral status as a rightholder) reasonably hinge on some-
thing that seems to matter  so little (whether damage to some portion of genetic 
material should be construed as  removing a capacity or instead permanently 
 undermining it)? Keep in mind that in the example your child is no diﬀ erent 
phenotypically from the other: they are equally sentient, equally intelligent, 
and equally incapable of ever being a moral agent regardless of whether genetic 
damage has removed the capacity for agency or is instead best construed as 
undermining it. 
 Ultimately Liao’s theory seems to require that we place tremendous moral 
weight on a relatively trivial distinction that just can’t be expected to bear that 
weight. Th is is a serious diﬃ  culty for this sort of approach, and it is one that 
doesn’t disappear if, due to empirical happenstance, it turns out that (for the 
moment) all humans with genetic damage lack damage to the particular genes 
deemed necessary for moral agency. I’ll say more later about why I think Liao’s 
approach ends up in such an uncomfortable position, but next I want to con-
sider additional counter-intuitive aspects of his theory. 
 Non-Humans Possessing the Genetic (or Physical) Basis for Moral 
Agency 
 Liao’s approach casts the ‘moral status’ net wider than many other approaches 
do, and includes children, embryos, and probably most anencephalic infants 
within the class of rightholders. An obvious danger of this approach is that the 
net is cast  too widely. While for many the inclusion of embryos and anenceph-
alic infants is already a sign that the net is too large, I’m not going to quibble 
with those inclusions here. Rather, I want to focus on cases that I think are 
signiﬁ cantly more problematic. 
 4 Liao would presumably protest at this point that he’s only oﬀ ering a  suﬃ  cient condition, and 
 perhaps some other condition could be introduced that would cover Betsy as a rightholder on 
diﬀ erent grounds. Perhaps, but until Liao oﬀ ers a plausible account of such a condition (and that 
would need to be an account which does not, in the process, make his ‘genetic’ condition for 
rightholder status appear redundant and thus toothless), the story of Betsy provides a signiﬁ cant 
challenge to the plausibility of Liao’s approach. 
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 Liao brieﬂ y discusses an example involving a non-human organic entity 
that nonetheless possesses the genetic basis for moral agency usually found in 
humans: 
 For example, suppose we injected these genes into a cabbage, would the cabbage 
be a rightholder? To answer this question, we should inquire whether these genes 
are integrated into the cabbage or not. If they are, then the cabbage may no longer 
be a cabbage, since its nature may have changed. In such a case, the resulting 
being may be a rightholder, given that it has the genetic basis for moral agency 
(178). 
 Liao understandably tries to soft peddle the strangeness of this result, suggest-
ing that the cabbage may well no longer be a cabbage but has instead become 
something much closer to a human being. Perhaps it has, though it is very 
hard to be sure since Liao doesn’t include an account of what would amount 
to proper ‘integration’. However, let’s consider a variant case in which the cab-
bage possesses (in a ‘properly integrated way’) the genetic basis for moral 
agency, but nonetheless that cabbage is damaged such that the capacity for 
moral agency, along with the capacity for sentience and rational agency, is 
permanently undermined. (Like an anencephalic infant that possesses the 
genetic basis for moral agency, this cabbage would appear to be a rightholder 
on Liao’s account, even though it lacks both actual moral agency and the 
potential for moral agency.) While I’m sure intuitions will vary here, I’m also 
certain that many people will ﬁ nd this exotic, damaged, insentient, righthold-
ing cabbage a rather unhappy consequence of Liao’s theory. 
 To make clearer just how counter-intuitive this case is, consider that, while 
Liao leaves open the possibility that other creatures that lack the genetic basis 
for moral agency could also possess rights, he gives in his paper examples of 
non-human sentient creatures (such as turtles) as non-rightholders:
 Suppose this is correct, and suppose rightholding has the function I suggested, 
this means that if and when the interest of a normal adult human being conﬂ icts 
with the comparable interest of a normal adult turtle, one ought to give the 
interest of the human being more weight. Hence, if a normal adult turtle and a 
normal adult human being both require rescue (suppose both are crossing the 
street and are in danger of being hit by oncoming traﬃ  c), and suppose that one 
can only save one of them, then one ought to save the human being, because the 
turtle is not a rightholder while the human being is. If one did not do this, then 
one would be acting wrongly (172). 
 Substitute the example of a human being as a rightholder with the earlier 
example of a genetically modiﬁ ed rightholding cabbage (an entity which, 
because of undermining genetic damage, lacks even the potential for moral 
agency) and we end up with the conclusion that one ought to give that 
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cabbage more weight morally (other things being equal) than a turtle. Indeed, 
we also ought to give the cabbage more weight than any sentient animal lack-
ing the genetic basis for moral agency, e.g. a great ape or a grey whale. To put 
it mildly, this is a result that seems to have very little intuitive support. 
 Th ings get stranger, however. Remember that on Liao’s view an entity need 
not actually possess the  genetic basis for moral agency: it is suﬃ  cient if the 
entity possesses something ‘functionally similar’. So, instead of a cabbage, let’s 
imagine an artiﬁ cial machine (such as a lawnmower) that has had the relevant 
hardware and software needed to count as ‘functionally similar’ to the genetic 
basis for moral agency. Imagine also that this machine has that hardware and 
software present and ‘integrated’ but permanently undermined due to damage 
(like the anencephalic infant). Th is lawnmower would be a rightholder even 
though it will forever lack sentience, moral agency, and even the potential for 
moral agency. It, like the cabbage, would have a moral status that (other things 
being equal) would trump that of a sentient animal lacking the genetic basis 
for moral agency. Further, on this account the modiﬁ ed lawnmower would 
appear to trump a  human being that possesses sentience but lacks the relevant 
genetic material for moral agency (such as Betsy, mentioned earlier). I think 
this apparent  reductio ad adsurdum , while not conclusive evidence of the false-
hood of Liao’s theory, does suggest that the supposed virtues of this approach 
deserve another look. 
 Th e Value of the Genetic Basis for Moral Agency 
 I’ve argued that Liao’s theory both accomplishes too much and too little: it 
grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it (e.g. the cabbage and 
lawnmower), and it does not provide grounds for oﬀ ering such status to those 
who arguably do deserve it (e.g. humans with a particular sort of genetic dam-
age). Liao is aware of at least some of these quite striking consequences of his 
theory, and presumably thinks they are a worthwhile price to pay for an 
approach that extends rights to most humans while avoiding speciesism. 
Perhaps this would be a reasonable concession if the worries that ground 
charges of speciesism have been avoided, but there are several reasons for 
doubting that the real diﬃ  culties have been dodged. 
 It is true that Liao’s theory is not one that could fairly be accused of specie-
sism: it does not, after all, attribute moral status on the basis of species mem-
bership. However, the reason speciesism is taken to be morally problematic 
is not simply that the speciesist attributes moral status on such a basis. 
Rather, the  problem with the speciesist, as Liao points out, is that she is seen as 
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attributing such moral status ‘without suﬃ  cient justiﬁ cation’ (160). In other 
words, species membership itself is not taken by the anti-speciesist to be a  mor-
ally relevant feature of an individual. (Contrast this with the capacities for 
sentience or moral agency, which are accepted by many, though of course not 
all, as morally relevant features.) With this in mind, the crucial question in 
evaluating Liao’s theory is whether it  does designate moral status on the basis 
of morally relevant features. Th e troubling cases I’ve already discussed should 
have aroused suspicion that this theory is not in fact tracking a morally rele-
vant feature in placing moral weight on the genetic basis for moral agency. 
I think there are also more general reasons for doubting that his account iden-
tiﬁ es a plausible basis for moral status. 
 Th ough Liao doesn’t directly address this issue, presumably he thinks that 
the genetic material relevant for moral agency possesses some sort of intrinsic 
or ﬁ nal value. 5 If not, it is quite hard to explain why we should grant it the 
moral importance that he thinks it deserves. Liao has argued forcefully that 
the genetic material should  not simply be valued instrumentally – it is not to 
be seen as valuable only because it can allow for either actual moral agency or 
the potential for moral agency. Th is seems to leave him with the view that the 
material must be valuable in itself. Can this possibly be right, however? Indeed, 
doesn’t the fact that Liao allows for ‘functionally similar’ non-organic material 
to serve the same role show that the genetic basis for moral agency is valuable 
not  in itself  but because of what it (normally)  produces? In other words, isn’t it 
an excellent example of something with a high degree of  instrumental value? 
 Consider again the ‘physical basis of moral agency’ possibility that Liao 
discusses. He allows that an appropriately programmed machine could possess 
the physical basis of moral agency and thus possess the moral status necessary 
to be a rightholder. To the extent that this seems at all plausible, I would argue 
that it is because we naturally think of such a machine as at least potentially 
capable of  exercising moral agency: what is valuable about that relevant series 
of 1s and 0s (embodied in hardware) is that they normally produce moral 
agency. In other words, that physically-realized stretch of programming code 
 5 ‘Intrinsic value’ is a diﬃ  cult term that gets used in a variety of problematic ways. All I mean 
to refer to here is a sort of value that is  not instrumental – such non-instrumental value is some-
times called ‘ﬁ nal value’ rather than ‘intrinsic’. I leave open the question of whether (on Liao’s 
account) the relevant genetic material should be thought of as possessing non-instrumental value 
in virtue of its intrinsic properties alone, or whether extrinsic properties also factor into the ﬁ nal 
value. (My hunch is that given Liao’s insistence on ‘integration’ extrinsic relational properties will 
also be relevant here.) For more on the possibility of ﬁ nal value based on non-intrinsic proper-
ties, see Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic 
and for its Own Sake’,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1999): 33-52. 
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is instrumentally valuable because it normally allows for the entity to possess 
something that seems valuable in itself: actual moral agency. It seems highly 
implausible to think that, on top of its obvious instrumental value, that series 
of code  also possesses some sort of non-instrumental moral value. (Certainly it 
may possess  aesthetic value if it happens to be a particularly elegant stretch of 
coding, but that isn’t the sort of value Liao needs in order to do the ethical 
heavy lifting that is necessary here for his account.) Th e lesson in all this, I 
think, is that insofar as we have a tendency to value the genetic (or physical) 
basis of moral agency, what this shows is not that that bit of genetic material 
(or physical information) is morally relevant, but that moral agency is. 6 
 Speciesism Reconsidered 
 At reaching this point in the argument, some will conclude that Liao would 
do best to abandon his theory and instead adopt a more conventional approach 
that attributes moral status on the basis of either actual or potential moral 
agency. Th e diﬃ  culties with such approaches have been usefully highlighted 
by Liao; however, they tend to exclude some humans that many think deserve 
moral status as rightholders. Because I share Liao’s belief that defending the 
notion that all human beings are rightholders is a worthwhile endeavor, I 
encourage him to reconsider the dreaded speciesist option. 7 
 I won’t attempt a complete defense of a speciesist approach here – instead 
I’ll simply highlight the beneﬁ ts of such an approach for someone with Liao’s 
conviction that all human beings are rightholders. 8 As should be obvious, 
 6 It is ironic that early on in his paper Liao dismisses the idea that all humans possess ‘intrinsic 
worth’ as grounding moral status because, as he says, it is not a notion that one can ‘empirically 
identify and assess’ (161). As I hope is clear, his own account ends up relying on something very 
much like a notion of intrinsic worth, but he must attach that value to the genetic material 
necessary for moral agency – a signiﬁ cantly less intuitive and thus less plausible move than link-
ing such value to sentience, actual agency, or even just the bare fact that one is a human being. 
 7 I’m not as fond of the language of rights as Liao, so I’d prefer to couch things in terms of all 
humans possessing a basic moral status (which I think probably amounts to much the same 
thing), but for the sake of simplicity I follow Liao and refer to ‘rightholder’ status here and else-
where in this piece. 
 8 An approach with which I am in sympathy can be found in the Bernard Williams article 
that Liao cites in n. 2 of his essay (Bernard Williams, ‘Th e Human Prejudice?’, in A.W. Moore 
[ed.],  Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008], 
pp. 135-54). Also recommended is Cora Diamond’s essay, ‘Th e Importance of Being Human’, 
in David Cockburn (ed.),  Human Beings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
pp. 35-62. Compelling criticisms of such approaches can be found in Jeﬀ  McMahan’s ‘Our 
Fellow Creatures’,  Journal of Ethics 9(3-4) (2005): 353-380 . 
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granting that membership in the species ‘human being’ has moral relevance 
easily allows one to cover just the cases Liao wants to cover: all human beings 
can be viewed as possessing the moral status needed to qualify as rightholders. 
We have no worries about some humans being left out or some exotic cab-
bages being let in. Th is is because this approach is indeed tracking something 
many take to have non-instrumental moral value: membership in the class of 
human beings. Also, a sensible speciesist will follow Liao’s lead and grant that 
species membership should best be understood as simply a  suﬃ  cient , but not a 
 necessary condition for the relevant sort of moral status. It can be left open 
whether other criteria are  also suﬃ  cient for attributing the status of right-
holder to, say, a non-human animal, an alien, or a machine. Relatedly, the fact 
that species membership is taken to be morally relevant for a particular indi-
vidual should not be seen as excluding the possibility that other features of 
that individual, such as the capacity for sentience, or the potential for moral 
agency, may also be morally relevant. 9 Indeed, it could turn out that the moral 
weight of these other features is signiﬁ cantly greater than the weight of species 
membership. Th e speciesist need not claim that being human is the  only thing 
that grounds moral status – she just claims that it is among the many things 
that can matter morally. 
 Defending the idea of species membership as in itself morally relevant is 
understandably controversial, but as I hope has become clear in the course of 
this discussion, attributing moral relevance to the genetic basis for moral 
agency appears to be signiﬁ cantly  more controversial – in fact it leads to con-
sequences many will ﬁ nd absurd. In the end, Liao’s approach does not ﬁ t 
nearly as well as a ‘speciesist’ account with the intuition that he wants to 
defend: the idea that all human beings share a fundamental moral status. 10 
   9 Here and elsewhere when I refer to the concept of species (and in particular the species 
human being) I am not referring to some particular  scientiﬁ c notion of species (which could, 
after all, turn out to be false), but rather the  folk concept of species as a kind. For more on this 
distinction, see Timothy Chappell, ‘On the Very Idea of Criteria for Personhood’ (unpublished 
draft). 
 10 I’d like to thank Matthew Liao for helpful discussions of his position and related issues. I’d 
also like to thank Daniel Callcut, Tim Chappell, Jeﬀ  McMahan, Valerie Tiberius and audience 
members at the Society for Applied Philosophy Congress at St. Anne’s College, Oxford, for com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
